MCP Settings Object Structure
Overview
The mcpSettings configuration provides global settings for MCP (Model Context Protocol) server security and behavior. This configuration is separate from mcpServers and controls how MCP servers can connect to certain domains and IP addresses.
Example
# Example MCP Settings Configuration
mcpSettings:
# Strict whitelist mode:
# allowedDomains:
# - "example.com" # Specific domain
# - "*.example.com" # All subdomains using wildcard
# - "https://api.example.com:8443" # With protocol and port
# - "http://mcp-server:3000" # Internal service, explicitly whitelisted
# Default SSRF mode with private service exemptions:
allowedAddresses:
- "host.docker.internal:8080" # Permit one private host on one port
- "10.0.0.5:8000" # Permit one private IP on one port
# Optional MCP OAuth catalog-recovery tuning; defaults are shown.
catalogRecovery:
discoveryBackoffMs: [300000, 600000, 1200000, 1800000]
discoveryTimeoutMs: 3000
reauthRetryMs: 1800000
maxStateEntries: 10000
generationReadTimeoutMs: 500
authorizationFenceRetryMs: [0, 50, 200]
authorizationFenceTimeoutMs: 1000
authorizationFenceRetryIntervalMs: 30000
authorizationFenceRetryBatchSize: 100Configuration
Subkeys
| Key | Type | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| allowedDomains | Array of Strings | A list specifying allowed domains for MCP server connections. | When configured, only listed domains are allowed. When not configured, SSRF targets are blocked but all other domains are allowed. |
| allowedAddresses | Array of Strings | An SSRF exemption list, scoped to private IP space. Hostname/IP + port pairs listed here bypass the default-deny SSRF block when `allowedDomains` is not configured. | Use when you want default SSRF protection AND specific internal MCP servers, without flipping `allowedDomains` into strict-whitelist mode. |
| apps | Boolean | Controls MCP Apps. When true, MCP Apps are enabled and MCP servers are connected with Apps support. When unset, only legacy HTML UI resources are rendered. When false, legacy HTML UI resources are disabled as well. | Apps render in a sandbox configured by mcpAppSandbox. |
| catalogRecovery | Object | Optional bounds for passive MCP discovery, OAuth reauthentication recovery, and cross-replica authorization fencing. | Uses the defaults shown in the example. |
apps
apps turns on MCP Apps, the interactive interfaces that MCP servers return with tool results. The setting is read on the server and also reported to the client at startup. Apps render in a sandboxed frame whose host, size limits, and rate limits are set by the top-level mcpAppSandbox object.
mcpSettings:
apps: truecatalogRecovery
catalogRecovery prevents passive catalog requests from repeatedly rediscovering disconnected OAuth servers and bounds the authorization-generation checks used across replicas. Most deployments should retain the defaults.
| Key | Type | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| discoveryBackoffMs | Array of Numbers | Progressive delays after failed passive discovery, in milliseconds (1-8 entries). | [300000, 600000, 1200000, 1800000] |
| discoveryTimeoutMs | Number | Timeout for one passive discovery attempt. | 3000 |
| discoverySettleGraceMs | Number | Additional time a timed-out discovery may retain its coalesced slot while it settles. | 10000 |
| reauthRetryMs | Number | Delay before retrying a server that requires interactive OAuth authorization. | 1800000 |
| maxStateEntries | Number | Maximum process-local server recovery states retained in memory. | 10000 |
| maxDetachedDiscoveries | Number | Maximum timed-out discoveries still settling before recovery stops starting new discoveries. | 3 |
| generationReadTimeoutMs | Number | Deadline for reading the cross-replica credential generation. | 500 |
| authorizationFenceRetryMs | Array of Numbers | Retry delays for publishing an authorization-generation fence (1-8 entries). | [0, 50, 200] |
| authorizationFenceTimeoutMs | Number | Timeout for each authorization-fence write attempt. | 1000 |
| authorizationFenceRetryIntervalMs | Number | Interval for replaying durable failed fence writes. | 30000 |
| authorizationFenceRetryBatchSize | Number | Maximum durable fence records replayed per interval. | 100 |
Concurrent passive discovery is coalesced per user and server. OAuth challenges settle into a stable reauthentication-required state, while transient token or cache outages remain retryable. Credential changes publish a generation fence so stale discovery results are discarded instead of being reused on another replica.
discoverySettleGraceMs may be 0 through 300000; the late discovery is never cancelled so a redeemed OAuth token can still persist. maxDetachedDiscoveries ranges from 1 to 1000 and bounds how many such released discoveries may continue before new recovery work waits for one to settle.
allowedDomains
Security Context (SSRF Protection)
LibreChat includes SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) protection with the following behavior:
When allowedDomains is NOT configured:
- SSRF-prone targets are blocked by default
- All other external domains are allowed
When allowedDomains IS configured:
- Only domains on the list are allowed
- Internal/SSRF targets can be allowed by explicitly adding them to the list
Blocked SSRF targets include:
- Localhost addresses (
localhost,127.0.0.1,::1) - Private IP ranges (
10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16) - Link-local addresses (
169.254.0.0/16, includes cloud metadata IPs) - Internal TLDs (
.internal,.local,.localhost) - Common internal service names (
redis,mongodb,postgres,api,rag_api, etc.)
If your MCP servers need to connect to internal services or Docker containers, either add them to the strict allowedDomains whitelist, or leave allowedDomains unset and add the exact private service to allowedAddresses.
Pattern Formats
The allowedDomains array supports several pattern formats:
-
Exact Domain Match
allowedDomains: - "example.com"Only allows connections to exactly
example.com(any protocol/port) -
Wildcard Subdomain Match
allowedDomains: - "*.example.com"Allows connections to all subdomains of
example.com(e.g.,api.example.com,mcp.example.com) -
Specific IP Address
allowedDomains: - "192.168.1.100" - "172.24.1.165"Allows connections to specific IP addresses
-
Local Docker Domains
allowedDomains: - "mcp-server" - "host.docker.internal"Allows connections to Docker container names or special Docker domains
-
With Protocol and Port
allowedDomains: - "https://api.example.com:8443" - "http://internal-mcp:3000"Restricts connections to specific protocol and port combinations
Error Messages
If you see errors like:
error: [MCPServersRegistry] Failed to inspect server "my-mcp": Domain "http://172.24.1.165:8000" is not allowed
error: [MCP][my-mcp] Failed to initialize: Domain "http://172.24.1.165:8000" is not allowedThis likely indicates that the MCP server's private host and port need to be added to allowedAddresses, unless you intentionally use allowedDomains as a strict whitelist:
mcpSettings:
allowedAddresses:
- "172.24.1.165:8000" # Add the private host/IP and MCP portallowedAddresses
allowedAddresses is an exemption list for the SSRF private-IP block, not a domain whitelist. It is the right tool when you want to permit one or two specific private/internal services without restricting what your MCP servers can reach in the public internet.
When to use it instead of allowedDomains
allowedDomains is a strict whitelist: when it is set, only listed entries are reachable. Adding a private IP there to permit, say, a self-hosted MCP server also blocks every public destination (api.example.com, *.googleapis.com, etc.) that you didn't also list.
allowedAddresses is used only when allowedDomains is not configured. It permits specific private host:port targets while leaving the rest of the public internet reachable through the default SSRF policy. Common configuration:
mcpSettings:
allowedAddresses:
- "host.docker.internal:8080"
- "10.0.0.5:8000"
# allowedDomains is intentionally not set: public destinations
# remain reachable, only listed private host:port services are exempted.If allowedDomains is configured, it is authoritative: private services must be listed there instead of relying on allowedAddresses.
Acceptable entries
- Hostnames with port:
host.docker.internal:8080,mcp-server:3000,localhost:3001 - Private IPv4 literals with port:
10.0.0.5:8000,127.0.0.1:3001,192.168.1.10:443,169.254.169.254:80 - Bracketed private IPv6 literals with port:
[::1]:3001,[fc00::1]:8080,[fe80::1]:8080
Rejected entries (validated at config load)
- URLs / paths / CIDR ranges:
http://10.0.0.5,10.0.0.0/24,/path - Bare hostnames or IPs:
localhost,10.0.0.5,::1,[::1]: every entry must include a port - Invalid ports:
localhost:0,localhost:65536,localhost:http - Public IP literals:
8.8.8.8:53,1.1.1.1:53,[2001:4860::8888]:443: the field is scoped to private IP space; public IPs are not SSRF targets and a public-IP exemption has no defensive purpose
Hostname trust
A hostname entry trusts whatever IP that hostname resolves to at runtime on the listed port. If the DNS for a listed hostname is rotated or hijacked to point at a different private IP, the exemption follows. Only list hostnames whose DNS you control. Prefer literal IPs when you can.
References
- MCP Servers Configuration
- MCP Features
- Actions allowedAddresses (similar concept for Actions)
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